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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The issue involved in this case centers on the constitutionality 
and moral justification of the classifications based on marital status 
and personal life style which were created by the Individual Income 
Tax Act of 1973. 
It is the contention of the Appellant that such are unnecessary, 
unreasonable, and arbitrary as it requires individuals (with the 
same amount of taxable income) to pay personal income tax at variable 
rates based on circumstances that are irrelevant to the need for any 
such distinction. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Defendent's Motion to Dismiss the Warrent of Judgement of the Tax 
Commission of the State of Utah was denied as the judge had no authority 
to do othen1ise. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests the Court to: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Reverse the decision of the Lower Court from which 
appeal is being made. 
Order the Utah State Tax Commission to refund overpayment 
made by appellant in the amount of $494.36. 
Declare that portion of the 1973 Income Tax Law which sets 
differential tax rates based on marital status an~ ~ers?nal 
life style as an unreasonable and arbitrary class1f1cat1on 
and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
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2 
If the Court does not see fit to do the above, appellant requests 
that the Court order that current tax law be made consistent whereby 
all taxes paid within the State of Utah (i.e., sales and property), 
be collected or asses<od at variable rates based upon the marital 
status or personal life style of the taxpayer as is now provided by 
the State Income Tax. 
STATEtmn OF FACTS 
As a result of the enactment of the Individual Income Tax Act of 
1973 which created a differential in income tax rates based on circum-
stances of marital status and personal life style rather than on income 
itself, aop2llant has refused to voluntarily pay the tax differential 
whicr ·" 311:cu~t above 1~hatever the lowest rate may be (in this case, 
married, filing jointly) on the same taxable income Qmount. 
From 1974 through 1977 the appellant has petitioned the Tax Commissicr 
under provision of Section 59-14A-72 of the Utah Code, for a "redeterm-
ination of deficiency" with the intent of pro vi ding the means whereby 
appellant could apply to the Utah State Supreme Court (59-14A-76) for 
a "writ of certiorari or revie\~ for the purpose of having the lawfulness 
of such decision inquired into and determined." 
During this period of time the Tax Commission refused to provide 
due process by contending that the only point at issue was an error 
in "mathematical com[Jutation" (59-14A-75) which therefore prevented 
application to the Supreme Court for review. 
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3 
In March of 1978 the Tax Commission was persuaded by the appellant 
to have issued a warrant for delinquent income tax in the amount of 
$482.79 and to appear in Court to answer concerning his property. 
This was done with the intent of allowing for due process and 
providing a means for appeal to the Utah State Supreme Court. 
On May 31, 1978 the appellant appeared in the Third Judicial 
District Court on a Supplemental Proceeding. His Motion to Dismiss 
the judgement filed by the State Tax Commission was denied. 
A Designation of Record on Appeal was filed with the Clerk of 
the Third District Court on June 28, 1978. 
POINT I: That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which 
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style 
is an unreasonable and arbitrary Legislative classification. 
The most important and most valid point in the argument for the 
relief sought by the appellant is based on Article I, Section 24 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah which states in summary that 
"all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Appellant proposes to establish that: 
1. The Income Tax of the State of Utah is a law of general nature. 
2. That there is no justifiable basis for differential treatment 
in tax rates based on marital status and personal life style 
circumstances and that such is unreasonable and arbitrary. 
3. That there is no fair reason for the income tax law (as it 
presently exists) to not apply it equally in extension to those 
it leaves untouched. 
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4 
The Individual Income Tax law of the State of Utah is general in 
nature and universally applicable as evidenced by Section 59-14A-5 of 
the Utah Code which states that " ... a tax is hereby imposed on the State 
taxable income, as defined in Sections 59-14A-10 and 59-14A-11, of 
every resident individual, and every nonresident individual. .. " 
Except for its progressive nature (based on increased taxable income) 
the State Income Tax until 1973 \vas also universally applicable in its 
rate structure to all persons with the same taxable income. 
As a result of the changes in income tax law in 1973 the uniform 
operation of the law ceased, even though its general nature continued. 
This in and of itself should be sufficiently convincing to establish 
that the present law is contrary to general constitutional intent as is 
stated in Section 24 that" ... all laws shall operate uniformly wherever 
uniform laws can te erected." The State income tax can be enacted to 
operate uniformly 6~ 1t obviously did prior to 1973. 
Section 24 continues that the " ... object and purposes of la1·1 present 
touchstone for determing proper and improper classification," and that 
"one who assails legislative classification as arbitrary has burden of 
proving it to be such." 
What then was the object or purpose of the ueation of these classi-
fications where there were none, and where they were already operating 
uniformly? It is assumed that if there were no justifiable purpose for 
the classifications then they would be arbitrary, and furthermore, if 
there were no reasonable differentiation between classes as relating to 
the purposes to be accomplished by the income tax law, then they would 
again be arbitrary. 
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Obviously the basic intent of the 1973 Income Tax Act was to 
parallel the Federal Income Tax law for purposes of administrative 
convenience. The appellant does not deny this to be a legitimate 
objective. However, in the creation of various tax rate structures 
wher~ one pays more than another with both having the same taxable 
income, then the question of fairness immediately arises, especially 
when nothing of substance changed in the circumstances of the two 
individuals from one year to the next (i.e., 1972 to 1973). 
It is evident that legislative intent was not totally concerned 
about administrative convenience or paralleling the Federal tax 
classification structure as one, it did not include the "Head of House-
hold" filing status and secondly, one basic progressive rate as pre-
viously existed was at least as convenient to administer as the three 
established, regardless of whether it corresponded to the Federal or not. 
Legislative action for purposes of administrative convenience is 
one thing, however, when it affects the individual taxpayer adversly 
and for no apparent reason, then it must be justified on a more sub-
stantial basis than mere ''administrative convenience." 
As the line of thinking of the Court will no doubt lead to an 
examination of the reasoning behind the existing Federal tax filing 
structure, the appellant has included a copy of a Federal Tax Court 
and Court of Appeals decision which focuses on the reasoning and 
supposed justification of the subject at issue. (See Appendices and 
2: Federal Tax Court, Vivien Kellems, Docket No. 427-70, 6-27-72, and 
same, U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit, Docket No. 74-2122, 4-4-73). 
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Let it be understood that the appellant makes reference to the 
above Federal court decisions for purposes of illustration only and for 
the convenience of you, the Supreme Court. The appellant strongly 
objects to the Utah State Supreme Court finding reason to justify 
changes in the State tax law based on Federal statute. The issue at 
hand is State legislative action regardless of Federal precedence. 
It is, however, important to briefly examine the supposed Congressionc 
line of reasoning which created the current tax differential based on 
marital status and personal life style. You will note from this particular 
case that two" ... rational basis for distinction" are given: 
1. The geographic equalization of taxpayers as between community 
and non-community property states. 
2. The recognition of the greater financial burdens of married 
persons. 
Little cr~~'~ ~eed be made regarding point number one, as any 
conflict in tax administration between community and non-community 
property is totally irrelevant to the requirements of the Individual 
Income Tax of the State of Utah. 
No doubt in 1948 when this became a problem, the Congressional 
action taken seemed reasonable to many. Thirty years later this is 
certainly not the case, and to use it as justification to perpetuate 
an unreasonable system of classification is for the most part a red 
herring response. To say that one inequity must continue because of 
the existence of another law which in itself is inequitable is begging 
the question. It is like saying you cannot go for a walk because you 
have a rock in your shoe and leaving it at that. 
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The second point having to do with "the greater financial burden 
of married persons" is the only serious justification for the classifi-
cation that the appellant is aware of, although at times some verbalize 
that single people deserve to be penalized for not being married. 
If there is, or ever was, any validity to the present classification 
system, it comes down to one issue which is the second point mentioned. 
In 1948 it may have appeared that this was a reasonable extension of 
the "ability to pay" theory, but today that is for the most part a myth. 
The appellant submits his own situation as an example: In 1970 the 
appellant v1as employed in the State of Michigan at an annual salary of 
$13,500 with his wife earning approximately $1,000 from part time work. 
As a result of a divorce, he returned to Salt Lake City to be closer to 
where his former wife and son were residing. He began employment at an 
annual salary of $10,000. His former wife r ... .u vu"'"'t" t•"f.l'oyment at 
approximately $5,000 per year. In 1973 the appellant purchased a one-
bedroom condominium for $17,000 with a monthly payment and service fee 
of $170. His former wife was renting a duplex at $150 per month. An 
approximate breakdown of their monthly income and living expenses in 
1973 compared to when married in 1970 is as follows: 
(see next page) 
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Monthly I ncor1e/ ~art_ Former \life When r~ 
Expenses 
Gross Income $ 1,066 $ 570 $ 1,208 
Taxes and Ded. 266 67 292 
Take-home P"Y 800 503 916 
House payment/rent 170 150 145 
Food 60 100 125 
Clothing 10 15 '30 
Insurance 35 10 30 
Utilities 30 45 60 
Contributions 30 40 65 
Recreation 40 20 30 
Installment Payments 150 15 110 
Transportation 50 40 80 
Child Support 120 
Mi see ll aneous 100 75 140 
Savings 5 -7 101 
TOTALS $ 800 $ 510 $ 916 
This above 1ce1111"-ation of income and expenses is sufficiently 
accurate to substantiate the fact (and the appellant and his former 
wife would testify to such) that neither of them had an increased 
"ability to pay" income taxes at a higher rate as a result of their 
change in marital status. In fact, the situation was more to the 
contrary. They were both suddenly faced with the necessity of main-
taining two separate households with no expenses being reduced that 
at the same time were not balanced off by increases in others and 
substantial decreases in individual income. At least in their case 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
(when married) they did have more funds available for savings and non-
necessities than in either category of "single" or "head of household," 
and their situation does not appear to be that much different than many 
others in similar circumstances. 
This should not be surprising. Whether married, single or head of 
household, the basic and essential expenses are for the most part fixed. 
The only really significant variable is the number of children, which 
(if not fairly treated) is at least acknowledged in the provision for 
"exemrtions." 
For a moment let us assume that in ~married households only one 
person were employed and at the same time had several children. That 
would at least cause one to reflect on the desirability of manipulating 
the tax structure for the purpose of accomplishing or supporting what 
were considered to be socially desirable goals. 
Many years ago this may have been the case. However, now the 
situation has changed dramatically. Now in at least half the married 
households both parties are employed outside the home and at the same 
time average family size has decreased substantially. The end result 
largely negating whatever validity there may have been to any lessening 
of ability to pay income taxes in comparison to single or hearl of house-
hold status. 
Leaving aside for the moment the appellants own personal circum-
stances and bias, lets look for a moment at the situation of others who 
are less fortunate than himself in regard to the issue under discussion. 
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The status of two particular groups of people deserves special note: 
1. First of all there are thousands of adult single people 
in the State who for whatever reason(s) are not married-
which very often is not a matter of cho·ice, but because 
of circumstances largely beyond their control. Their 
desires are the same as a married person; one of the most 
important of which is that of getting out of an apartment 
and owning their own home. The majority of these individ-
uals are women who are in lower paying unskilled jobs. It 
goes without saying that such an individual with one income 
would at least have as equal a dificulty in being-able to 
obtain financing and making the payments on a purchased 
dwelling as a married couple with two incomes. The appel-
lant would assume there would be no disagreement as to 
their equal right to become a homeowner. 
2. Secondly, there is the large number of single parent "head 
of households" (again mostly women) v1ho are in a similar 
situation as the above and perhaps with even a greater 
need and desire to have their own home, yet must do so on 
one income. 
What is the essential difference (that justifies a different 
:ax rate) between the status of a single parent with two 
:h: lc,·e~ with an incorne of $10,000 per year, and a married 
couple with one child maktng ~10,000 annually? 
Treating people in such a manner is not only unreasonable 
and arbitrary, it is cruel--especially v1hen most of them 
accept their status in life and the benevolence of their 
government with resignation. 
The appellant admits he is not able to "prove" the foregoing 
assumptions or conclusions, but at the same time maintains that with 
the combination of v1hat is really common knowledge and the use of 
common sense, the v1eight of evidence would lean in the direction of 
his position. 
Regarding the issue of the "head of household" status: The 
present neglect of due consideration will probably be ackno11ledged 
through a recommendation of the Governor's present Tax Revision Com-
mittee to provide for such in the same manner as does the Federal 
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classification which operates on the rather thoughtless assumption 
that a head of household family has a greater ability to pay taxes than 
a married couple, but less than a single individual. This recommendation 
will not be surprising as it appeared to be some of the unfinished 
business of past tax revision committees. 
It is interesting to review the minutes of the Tax Revision Com-
mittee (on file in the State Capital Archives). The Committed was em-
powered by the 1967 Legislature to study Utah's taxes ~lith the "view of 
effecting a more equitable distribution of the tax burden and to prepare 
bills provided" and specifically to "study the adjustability or feasibility 
of coordinating the Utah Income Tax Act" with the Federal law. (Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 20 (2-3) (Supp. 1971). 
The first Federally based tax bill submitted to the Legislature in 
1969 contained only one tax rate schedule (S. 21, 38th Legislature, 1969). 
It appeared that as the Committee and the Legislature got more involved 
in trying to parallel the Federal structure they felt that they had to 
give up either the one rate structure or continue with what they thought 
was an administrative burden which was married persons having to file 
separate returns. What finally won out was a variable rate structure 
which would encourage married filing joint returns. 
In the process, it appears that what this action might do to the 
existing equitability of the system was disregarded and thus a new in-
equity was created mearly on the basis of accomodating the inflexible 
sacred cow of the joint return as if it were an unquestionable "given." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
Although not directly at issue in this case, it is worth noting 
that an equally nonsensical situation exists under the Federal system 
in regard to the so-called "marriage penalty" ~there a couple filing 
jointly mny claim only a $3,200 standard deduction, whereas each partner 
before marriage (or if living together as unmarried) can claim a $2,200 
standard deduction. So in this case it isn't just the unmarried who 
are the victims of unreasonable tax policy descrimination. 
What are we left with then that is still at issue. It has been 
established that, (at least in regard to the "head of household" category) 
... "there is no fair reason for the law that would not require equally 
its extension to those it leaves untouched." (Article 1, Section 24, 
Utah State Constitution). 
We now have the most difficult task which is trying to convince 
many who bel' "te 'yet would never admit it) that the si11gle status 
can be equdteJ with sin and the single parent as tainted or at least 
irresponsible, which somehow leaves them with a greater ability to pay 
taxes not only because they have more money but because they are part 
of an undesirable social cost and therefore merit such. 
Someone once said "When you go through the grocery line, they 
don't ask you your marital status and ring you up on another cash reg-
ister." What more can one say? Expenses of people, no matter v1hat their 
marital status and life style are much more similar than dissimilar. 
In general, any savings of expenses on the part of the unmarried is 
compensated for by a married couple's ability to pool resources, and 
likewise the lack of having the expense of children on the part of singles 
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is compensated (at least as much as should reasonably be expected) with 
the exemption provision and the fact that singles pay (through property 
and othet· taxes) a substantial portion towards the expense of educating 
other peoples' children. 
Therefore as a result of being unreasonably and arbitrarily 
classified the appellant and his former wife were required to pay 
additional amounts of 1973 State income tax over 1972 of $84.00 and 
approximately $18.00 respectively on the same dollar income. This increase 
is mostly attributable to the "single and head of household tax penalty" 
and not the increase in tax rates from 1972 to 1973. 
The position of the appellant is therefore that the only sensible, 
reasonable and fair way of taxing people is based on the ability to pay on 
income and any other extension of the "ability to pay" has no validity 
when making classifications for taxing purposes based on marital status 
and personal life style. Any such consideration, to be equitable, must 
be provided for through individual exemptions and itemized deductions. 
The appellant would take issue with one statement in Article 1, 
Section 24 of the State Constitution which states ... "In fixing the limits 
of the class, the legislative body has a wide discretion; and the 
Supreme Court may not concern itself with the wisdom or policy of the law." 
Let it only be said that if there were ever any truth to such a statement, 
that tilfle has long past. Almost by definition (now days) that is pre-
cisely what courts of appeal and supreme courts do do--is concern them-
selves with the wisdom and policy of law and its effects, call it by 
what narne you may. 
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POINT II: That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which 
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style 
is a "special lavi'' which is prohibited by the Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah State Constitution states that 
"the Legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws" 
in certain enumerated cases, one of which is "assessing and collecting 
taxes." 
Although what is termed as "special laws" is not defined, a General 
law is defined as: "Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon all 
members of any class of persons, places, or things, requiring legislation 
peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in question, are 
general and not soecial." 
The qLc5~~on nere then is do the legislatively created classifica-
tions ! c:•:Jd~' ·'·~ marital status and personal life style for taxing purposes 
really require legislation peculiar to themselves? Present la1·1 by 
definition gives "special" consideration to those living within the legal 
framework of marriage. Are the circumstances of persons in that category 
so special that they be allowed to pay less taxes than their single or 
head of household counterparts v1ith the same taxable income and comparable 
expenses? The appellant maintains that under an irnpartial judgement the 
answer must be no. 
POINT III: That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which bases 
tax rates on marital status and personal life style denies 
one equal protection and benefit of the law. 
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah states that: 
"All political pov1er is inherent in the pcorle; and all free governments 
are founded on their authority fot' their N]ual protection and benefit, 
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and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require." 
The appellant maintains that having variable tax rates based on 
marital status and personal life style in effect results in having two 
or more laws which apply to groups of people arbitrarily created by the 
Legislature which when analyzed it will be found as reiterated before 
" ... that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require 
equally its extension to those which it leaves untouched (Article I, 
Section 24). 
It is therefore a contradiction in terms to claim equal protection 
and benefit of the law when the existing law is in fact a multiplicity 
of laws which are administered in a discriminatory manner, and based on 
assumptions that are irrelevant to the requirements of the objective in the 
first place which is to tax income and not people. 
The other side of the coin of "due process" is "equal protection." 
The appellant, in having the Supreme Court review this appeal, has 
received due process. He is now requesting equal protection for him-
self and thousands of other residents of the State under one tax rate, 
as it is impossible to have such under two or more laws that apply to 
the same thing, and that same thing is equal amount of taxable income. 
POINT IV: That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which 
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style 
is a usruption of "Fundamental Rights" which are deemed 
essential under the Constitution. 
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah State Constitution states that 
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the 
security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government." 
The appellant acknowledges the necessity of legislative and legal 
(court cases) precedence for the effective and equitable administration 
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of government, however, he also sees that such precedence is a mixed 
blessing and at times a curse. An honest and enlightened appraisal of 
such would confirm this to be the case. The legislative and legal approach 
of today is too often an excess of justifying current action by the past 
without sufficient regard to letting (whatever is being considered) be 
judged on its own merits rather than questionable past precedence. 
An appropriate example (excepting it is on the Federal level) 
is the reversing of the long held acceptability of the "separate but equal" 
interpretation in Plessy v Ferguson (1896). At that time the Court said 
that a law which recognizes a difference in color "has no tendency to 
destroy the legal equality of the two races." Also adding that the 
Fourteenth Ammendment was not intended to enforce "soci a 1, as distinguished 
from pol i:i cal equality." If the enforced segregation "stamps the colored 
ra~-,, wl': che badge of inferiority, it is solely because the race chooses 
to put that construction upon it." 
Unfortunately it took the Court nearly 60 _,, 'rs to realize there 1;as 
something very fundatmentally wrong with previous lines of reasoning and 
logic. In Brown v Board of Education (1954), the Court stated that 
separate facilities (in education) were "inherently unequal" and that 
continuance by the states would breach the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amrr~ndment. 
The Utah State Supreme Court is well aware of the ramifications of 
this decision in all phases of civil rights since 1954. The issue of 
taxation based on marital status and life style is no less of a civil 
rights issue. Similar assumptions of the "separte but equal" mentality 
pervade today's justification of existing tax policy. One might rephrase 
the statement h'·'" Plessy: Ferg_rJ_s_D__fl_ by saying that "0 la1-1 which recognize 
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a difference in (marital status or life style) has a tendency to destroy 
the 1 ega 1 equa 1 ity of the (groups being taxed .l" At 1 east the Court can 
be assured that the frustration, anger, and resultant disrespect for 
unfair (if not oppressive) taxation on the part of many is not just 
because they "choose to put that construction upon it," it is because 
it is "inherently unequal." 
As to the precedence that has developed now for 30 years, it is 
due time for those who are in control and sit in judgement to begin 
asking why are we doing things the way we are and upon what justifica-
tion, and have our actions been arbitrary or unreasonable? 
For the security of individual rights, this issue demands the 
"recurrence to fundamental principles" and this is what the appellant 
is requesting the Utah State Supreme Court to do. Please, for the 
moment, discard the traditional mode of legal justification which uses 
the past as a standard for the future. 
The Constitution deems it as essential that you at times focus 
on fundamental principles and this cannot be done fairly by using prece-
dence as a crutch or a substitute for original thinking. 
POINT V: That portion of the present Utah State Income Tax which 
bases tax rates on marital status and personal life style 
is a denial of religious freedom and rights of conscience. 
Article 1, Section 4 to the Constitution states that "The rights 
of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exer-
ci se thereof." 
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The Court may think it rather naive on the part of the appellant 
to appeal to the "rights of conscience" in defending his position. 
If so, you are probably right if such stops at mere belief without 
action. History has shown that an appeal to a natural or higher lav1 
has always gotten its adherents into trouble, but this will no doubt 
always be the case. 
The appellant's point is quite direct and simple. He, as a matter 
of conscience (religion) believes (and without qualification) in paying 
his share of taxes to support the public "good." However, as a correlary, 
he also believes with the same conviction that being forced to pay more 
than his share is theft on the part of the government and an evil which 
is in precisely the same category as tax evasion. 
As f3ith without works is dead, likewise is belief without action. 
Thi.:c vi' 1 .roe appe: llant has no choice tiut to refuse to voluntarily pay 
the unjust tax under discussion. 
The making of an "ability to pay" determination beyond that based 
on equivelent taxable income amounts, is a moral judgement, which (however 
desirable) is one that courts and particularly legislative bodies are 
illsuited to do. 
It makes just as much sense to tax a person based on their sex, 
religion, or where they live as to do so through classification by 
marital status and life style. In fact it would make more sense to 
do so based on sex as males traditionally have higher incomes than females, 
and that isn't mere speculation or wishfull thinking. 
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If the Utah State Legislature, either individually or collectively 
had the wisdom of Solomon, the appellant would defer to its judgement. 
But as that hardly seems likely in his lifetime he cannot as a matter of 
conscience do so,as anything less would be a betrayal of his own integrity 
and a compromise of "the free exercise" of his religious convictions. 
SUMMARY 
In presenting his argument the appellant has tried to take what was 
a common sense approach to him. Not being a lawyer he hasn't been privy 
to the nuances of that profession which may have helped in his presentation. 
Nonetheless, the appellant believes he has sufficiently established the 
following so as to allow the Court to grant the relief sought: 
That the provision(s) of the 1973 Individual Income Tax of the 
State of Utah which provide for basing tax rates on marital status 
and personal life style is unconstitutional or violates the intent 
of such because: 
1. It is an unreasonable and arbitrary legislative classification. 
2. It is a "special law." 
3. It violates the concept of "equal protection and benefit of the law." 
4. It is a usurption of the "fundamental rights" of individuals. 
5. It is an infringement of the right of conscience and free exercise 
of religion. 
The appellant would appeal to the Court to reflect on the words of 
Oliver vlendell Holmes, Jr. who said, "The law is the witness and eternal 
deposit of our moral life. Its history is the history of the moral 
development of the race." Gentlemen, you are in a unique position to 
assist in that moral development which is so sorely needed. Please do so. 
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In conclusion, (and v1ith all due respect to the Court), if it sees 
fit not to grant the relief sought on this appoal, the appellant can 
only say that he tried, and then echo the \'lOrds of Charles Dickens 1·1ho 
once said, "If that's the law, then the lav1 is an ass." 
CERTIFICATE 
Ten copies of the foregoing appellant's Brief were delivered 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in care of the clerk of 
the Supreme Court, State Capital Building, Salt Lakc:e City, Utah; 
and two copies of the same were mailed to Bruce N. Hale, Attorney 
for Plaintiff end Respondent, 235 State Capital Building, Salt Lake 
Ci"':y. :J:ah 8~114, this~ day of September, 1978. 
~Ja''"''' .. !'.ight, ProSe 
Appe 11 ant 
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37G-i:d '!'-7-72 
(!:.te 3.:! ~ 5').::;~ :.'>H 'IC 
hence. not dPdue:Uble ,a_s a ,_ i:-.Un p 2'aln -~t 
the c:::tatc und2r sc-r~tion 2U.1:J (:".d {2). 
Fin3Uy, cve:n if tllt: r,•cJrd ~D 1 'lcJ:tcd 
the concll..L.s;on th:o.t tJ1cre w:L·:; fUll LJ.d 
a.dcq•.tc~te .Cl'n:;,id<:.ration i..r., y;10n.r~y or 
money's :\'.~orth ior t.~lC a::! c~':'li~·nt. if ~~L _v 
28, lrl-17, we v:ould cl'm.ci.uu-2 tlH;t T>Cli-
tiouer h:tS fai.l".'d to estJ..bE:h th~ • Ue-
ductilJilit~· of the ~1.50,000. Th~: <::-~-:n~i.!a­
tion v.ith rc~l '-.'Ct to ~~r..e settlc:rnent ri-t.1t-·J 
Jo,Iay 12. lf,Gi), Tcdtcs ..;.,:; c'>:LSbe:!.':tion 
for the SJ 50,•)00 settlement d~striUutivn 
the following: 
* ,. • in full scttleme-:.t o:t 311 clc-•i:n.s 
and di<1~Uti~:1 r.:::J.'lti..-:g to (1) "":he agT2'2-
ment bctwce!'l ::-.1~·. and ).f~-s. LJza~ 
dn.t~U. l\fay ~s. 19 ~-~ l;i; the a:n·cL:n":r.;: 
of trust of Lena G. V.:iz;,~r (..lclted F· Cru-
ary 14-, 1963, (iii) the various \\lEs o.~ 
Una G. Laz::r ~r.d ('~:r) th~ cst._lte of 
Lf>na G. L~~ar, • * • 
The sti.puL:.ti0n dxs not <l.p~·ntioa the 
$150,000 &"t":lenwnt di-str~bt;.Li0n ro t.lte 
fou.r (k~sig:J.ated b?ses of thr- cl:~im3 rA 
Susan R. Simon, et aL Peht"I,~::J..'l' has pr~­
sc:r.ted no evidence upon which a r>-::;c::on-
ablc apportionment of ;_t.nv n.r;:t vi t:~2 
$150,000 .:::cttleln,;nt Cist;:-ib1_;ti0n conld be 
mad~ to U1e rl§;hls of ~:;l.::;:1J1 ?... Simon. f•t 
al., 8.9 third party cLli:nu.nrs tmcl.·~r ti1e 
agre':'mcnt dated 1-fay 2S, ~d-17, e.s CJ..S-
ti..o~;-...:::::::.~ ~ ::--:·:-.~ 't~~._'.:- ~ ~ ,~~ ._..._.. ·~·-··· u-
CiarieSJ cf tile tc.st.'lmeEtarv estate under 
prior '\\Tills or otherv .. -is'!. Tiu:r.-::-fore. neti-
tloncr would still ha·.-e failed to Cfitai:l:~ ·n 
the deductibility of tile Sl50,000 settle-
ment di'.::.iribution or any '[l:J.rt thc-rt.of 
under section 2053. R~yethon Production 
Corporation, 1 'l'.C. 952 ! 1943), aff'd. 
1H F.2d 100 [32 AFTR 1155] (C.A. 1, 
1914). 
Decision w-ill be entered for respon-
dent. 
[1158.56] 58 TC No. 5G. VIVIE._"< 
KELLE:,!S. Docket No. 427-70. 6-27-72. 
Opinion by \VITHEY, J. Ye:1r 19G3. 
Decision for Commissioner. 
TAX ON L'IDIVID"GALS-Rates of 
tax--constitution3Jity. Fe-deral income 
tax laws as c.tpplif'd. to sin:;le taxpayer 
e.re constitution:ll. Compuv.lion of t.J...x-
payer's ta_x through use of r~ltes :Lppli-
cable i.o single per~ons rc~t..iler than 
marriC'd person:: <.lldn't colli>i.ltute un-
con.stitulional cla:~siiica.tion. Ref: 1972 
P-H Fed. U 3<27. 
David R. Shelton, for :he p..:;titioner. 
DaV.:d J',L Reizes 2....11d Barry D. Gvnion, 
for the T2E~~nd~nt. 
"A?rEEY, J1td,ae: P..espondent Uel:er-
~ined ... ~ .rlcrle e_!lc:· i!". F'ede:-::1 h1coroc t4'.: 
.._Jr pr:L-1tioc2r !:or t..he year tndtd Decen-
btr 21, 1.~:t::;, ~ t:ne amc·unt of $813.3J. 
r:c-~nr:-::er.t has 2.!.so den.:ed peti.tioner's 
CJ.3.lll1 _fol' re~d o: ta..":f;s :or t..lJ.e same 
year 1n the arr~ount of ~2,939.13. Tbe 
i.s::l:'t~ raised by way cf the notir:e ot 
d_eficien,:;y f:avir g b~n concMerl t-y p=t!.-
~onE'r at the tir,Le ci t!~~.l, the r·;m"'i.::J.i"'1g 
L~s~J~ 1s ':.~e alloY\".1.thlty of peitior..er'.i 
cls~rr. fo:;:- ref'Jnd ·,vh-:rh is b:ts ... --d uoon the 
2.Ss.::n.; en that the compcrt<1t1.:m Ot "D~ti­
~-:L..lner s t<.tx throur;h the use of ~tes 
-1pfliC3.ble to sinzle peroc•ns :r-c.tl:er ths.., 
m?.T!"ieC. pt:r.zcn.s cOJ>citu.t~d an unconst!-
tu+-i0n"'.l cl::< <:.:;i13ca:Uo:n. 
Fli'-7DINGS OF FAGr 
Pditior.er, a sin~le per<:~.:>n from 194.7 
to the time of trial of this caf-le, resided 
::.:t East Haddam, Connecticut, a.t the 
Erne ot' :6.1in~,; the peti+ . .w1J.. Both neti-
tio~~.e,.. s ::!.9(,.5 indi"vidual rdli.rl and cl:;im 
for refund were riled wi'ch the district 
direotor of incernal revenue, HartioJ.·d, 
Coru:.ecticut. 
ThE~ tax on petitioner's return, as 
filed, wz.s compute-d by petitio:ter on the 
basis of the !'tites set fcr+..h in sect!:)l .. 
l(J.) (2) of t...~e Int~al Revenue Code 
of 1954 as amended through 3965. 
OPINION 
Having conceded the only issue with 
reg<.mi tu the notice oi deficiency, peti-
tioner claims entitlement to a refund of 
inciJme tax paid for 1965. The bo.~..s for 
petitioner's claim is that U1e proVIS.icns 
of the Ir1tern~ Revenue Oode prov:iding 
a rate of t.Rx <1.pplicable to petitioner, 
who .is a sin~le person, higher than the 
ra.te a{>pEc3.ble to joint returns of 
married pt'rsons are unoonsti tutioiL.."tl 
Of/icWl Tax Court Sl/l!!lbus Rnd. in viob.tic.·n 0f tl:.e fifth, ninth, four-
[11 PdiUonc>r, a ~iJ1~~~,;; :;ocr:::on, com-....-~'.!:t.t.:e~~th, and ~~ ..... --te~r:.th alllendm('nta &ad, 
putod her t.:a.x en Ul(J iJo.UJ:.J Qi ~::~~-c. ltC!.) t.:?.)_, a.rt.J.c1!j 1, ~ct4vn 2a cla.U3e 31 and ~ol~ 
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7-7-72 Viv~en )(cllcn1S 
1, section 9, clause 4 of the ·unit~-rj S~:lL;.;, pJyl·~· I;, th. 
Constitutio:l.1 i'.J"c>Jn·c1p, .. :1 
PeUtioner's arg<tmcnt \'.·1th I'.~:::,,ect to 
the ninth_ :!Tid s:.-.:teen~h ;-;_m·~·;r:mr·.'!~-i .··n 1J 
with rt:SjJcct to the fir...;t rl!'LlL le ui· U1\.' 
Constihltinn is app::.uc·ntly' ti!:ll Uw 
amotmt of bx p:-ud b~· hf·r in exc · -'' CJl 
that which would be p:>;:Jbl(· if jl)'r.t :·,,_ 
turn rates y;crc apJ)lic:d to h>"·!' LJ1\:U.JJ~.- i · 
not an incomP h.x, and ._:,\so i."i ~10L ~'- t~1:-< 
which is appo;tin:V"ol "~m•_no- l:1c ~t:·:·-·s 
Thi9 arg-um· n~. pr,··.JJc2.t .J C.:! r::.' (> 
tiOn thz.t thC' "C'{r'.'.3S'' L> ._l f' 11\lt~· fv~· 
rem:1ining sing\• ... :\! J noL 1.11 Jr.c0nv: ·. :x. 
is witlJ.O'-lt r,~~r<t Xn ·~\'lclc':lr·~ h;1s b·:-t:t 
submitteci shrJ\\"ing th+? m~cnt of Con-
gress was to rp;;,-ul2.t~ or rc s"':_ri{.:t or 
penalize persons w/10 are not nL1Trivc.l. 
Although the fourte::~.:nth ar:.1C!1\~mcnt 
is generally ::rr-:rEc.'~.b!c to s~·-•tr.s r,•thPr 
than to the F,__,:Jf.r:J.l £o·;c...-,m·:·nt, t!:r~ 
·fourteenth o.mcmlrncnt conc'-pt ,-f C'i'1Ual 
protedion h~~-c t-r·cn hdll :n C"rt·: ;'i. nor_l-
ta.x situ:;tior .. ::: to be 1~1!E 1..0 ~hr· 
United .S::.-,tc-s thro'J·';-_ _:; ,~_;.':h :p·;en<i-
mcnt. EollL: .· v . .Sb :~ i 7 U.,--:. -1fl7 
(1954): .ro \'. T~1~ '.~T'~' on :)~1 ~ U.S. 
61S. 13-~~ \" ··:=.>•.Jt :-:r.::-r iCJC::llly 
\\'lll ntl-::. h ~.rlr 1 .;!1\ :.,t ·~,- of 
f ~ c_::; r. t:nn 'iJ·: l'l ,, '-' , 1· rnr 
t•1 ,,; ;'l rr ri h'. 
:\1dJll!~ tid \'. 1:1),11 1 (![ L: _IJI 
(\.;-r,1·l'r:.. :~rq 1- ~. ~,._: ,'(•" !1'• 
o1- ;-,larysnlle, ~';"~) V.S. ,JS~. :J' C-.):O,l 
( 1 f ~ ~) ). " .: * 
Petit ioner'c: C'f·nt rJl ~r~~11m r.: th1: 
h:-<lL' nn t'lc j-:,;11·' r,f \'."hL·ilH•J' th.-- C'r•urL 
1 !'2',i•J''.d 1,, .• ,_.~ fur ~il' Jl--
·:on o]fd\'.'ll l,,,-,_,;•·o'n r.l:llf\(·i .LnrJ 
;:;:Ln _v\c- f ---:·;::o'l·..: for ~~;lf"'"'~~0~ (•[ 1ht.: :T-
pLC~tL•lt> r,lt·~·s ot LJ"-:ijtJr)Jl. 1,\'e do p::r· 
cciw· ·n~-ch n h:1: •. · 
This c1.:--tin·:-hrn \\' ·-; ,j:;.~n'.Tl for tlH' 
f1::-L t!ll~0 hy .<-~:-:~;on :--it)1 of 1he r!,\·f·:lih.' 
.\c·. o~· l.~·.; ), f.~! ~ :.1t 114. ;.1 rt }J ·~ l•._-
::1lJ.lllCc1 :1. p:1rL c·f th0 CoV:;-- . 1:1rc 
Lt'_' -.~;·;(' JJ .. ..:tr,r•: cl·:;c-1 ,•;,___" C!lT1:_J~' . ..; • 
.::·Jon.d 1rtc-r.t. >n t::c· •J'llctr:l•·-nL 1J: t~:('. 
pH•vL-ion t0 l 
Li· n c.; t.-_-...;: 1 ~ 
· • g..:u ~ :·q)~llC l'fl\: 11 •:':1-
·-JJ'i:: ,,, , , ·:·:r. - '1·, 
r-qtE\lJ:;:m::~; 1•·. ••n \\-.1._ nw~•1tL ~r, 1\)j·t_:-
:-ot~ll :1. .::.u0~·~.1n~1 ll :.nd :t::nwdi,llc tl"1·d 
stD\in·: 
esse.:: 
case~ 
Inc"-' 
,(.-ct:.)n· W~l~ .:'..11 Lly .:-.tate 20h.:l\'llr~nL-;. ;__,(loLLrL: <..'·~)l-
·; ,, ·~.dm1 nt in n~unit~· y.rmwrty ll.',\·.~ r.l'hr~ ::~nt r'1VLI-··d 
C:our::. J,,_::, 1,_.- \.; .: .::•J . .t-.i _r,, 
judicial Tl.'\iC·\': 01 c·l.1" ·,_:r ~.t:c,n:o: '..\'J~!,,r. 
the Internal RC'vcm.1r-- c :n P!l'; ·r] 
States v. :•far~/t.:mU s:-, Sh:' :·,__·. 1n.s. 
Corp., 1.00 u.s. 4 [26 A1 ·.:,J ~·o-: ,_:;-;-~q 
(1970), a c~sc in \\·h:c·a t· , t;:il 
tion argument w:u m.rtU·. ·-'Y 
!ll --~ ~- .. J 'C.:Li !J_;· 1' ,, (!'' \'_ \. ":Jt 0! t::C h'll' 
~.r'•J t i.l' . 1 :·1(' Lt':!le c ll~:'i~' .~..:ntlU; 
n:T~tlOn 1n s;:~ ':t·,,j Ff"t·~'•.Ll r·,\·c·rnrr: 
Co;:;..'n ·3 fvlt ll_ l_•illll~ Jlolt (• !'•.Ci.h· J.l 1 '\ 1: 
llH~ c;' c't of CllJn':1\'11ll ." Tll'<J)KtL:; l:cv::; 
;n l1:--.!1t oi I.~J,,: Lir c:-.:on ol Puc v. :-::· .·:.:.L.Jrn, 
1 The rc1c\":"int -'>L'-' .(•r..~ ,f lt,~• r:. l 1-:t \'C.--::JC c.),h- a.~ ~~m,·m~ul tt·:-nu ;li l'uiJ!i~ 
Lawf.S-272, F'c>bru:1;y :t~ l•llllo-,'.-.:l: 
Sec. 1(a)(2J. • • • .._., __ 0 t· ni \0 ,., -,r i'r"·~nr.i:' tftf'r D•·C'•.'mlJcr 2.1, 
there is h.::r •. :l_,;.· H1llJ·:>.;;• ..1 "n ti:r_ t~·· .!.· r·t· r ·ll , \•'!\" 1!.·-l'. 1· .. ·1: 1 1 .. u~ :· t;; 11' 3. ht. 
of a household to ·wl,ow .:;uiJ.JC-CtJOII Ll tax l~elC>l'lllllled 1n ;n::corJ:u:..._e WJLb 
the following w.::Jlc: 
Over $J1,000 but not over S,lG,()('() 
Over $26,000 but not over S32,(1(l{) 
Sec. 2(a). RatC' of Tax. Tn t!:f· 1,f n. hi:--• ;·r·tLJrn "f .~ hl•.~h 
section 6013, the 1r:1r..-::-,(·d l)\· ~u .nn .;~~.!he t-.\,• ~h·· t:x ',\Ill' 
lmpo::oc•d if the 1r.~-0mc \\'•·l"r' rllt l'l 
After givin£;" diccc ~o t),. P· 
noUco of dHickncv, tlH• :Ct. 11,, · 1··: ''-
the pro\·isior:s ot .:<t•c:\"11 ]I \JI::'t 1 1_., .. r 1 ., 
provi.-.,ion ul :::cct, •'l -.:• ,I 1 .-.·. ,'•r• 
v.ould b(' ~~.5<·,., :.!ri: thP '· .I• · :·o :1. t 
~ 7tiiee%~1~~.~~r~~-,;~~·t-~r,\'~~ .: :- ">"' ::1;, •Jr a -·~ 1 I'r fl'J'Jlt n Ju,, 
Is H. Rcpt. l-'o. 1::7-1, ~Oth (.::.-ng-., ~..1 SC'.":-!. (l~lh), E!l0-1 ('_]_;_ 211, ~GO a llJIU. ~t ~·Jl. 'Ibid. at 208. 
',\ l f ~~ 
i hu 
!, J' l 
lJc•lJ•IIl:L;' 
~ S3.5J 
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2~2 u.s. 101 [0 J~rTn ~71/l (](1~01. 5 
'l'h-:.· c·f:ccl of Uw Jf•'t'3 ~\ct w.ls to nro-
vitlc CCllla1ii.\' ()f tr,:<Jtrnt.'nt tn rwr.:,ons 
who wrre l!l<:,rried \\'11\..'Lhc·r or not liVJTI0 
in a commtmity pru1wrt)-' ;;~Jt~. 
Petitioner <Jr;:.-u:::;:; that i.c: . ;ue IS not 
tnken \•.ith the v;i ~:.iJm of ~ht' en~tr;tment 
of the spllt-mcr;rDc dc·v1ce to fn~-:tr,Lte 
the anticipJ.ted ::::~Jtr- comrnurJt;: prqr-
erty J;,_·,•:.s, but l..ither j..;_-;11": js takc!l \'."'lth 
the dr•ni::'.-1 of the br::1et~t of the :split-
\Ve per-
cen c: tv-:r) ju."'L~t·,1tion.s wh,lt W.Js clon8 
by Ccn;::::res::l :n p-.._:, rc:c;p,_ct. Fil".:,t, it L:; 
rea:::;rJn;:,-hle fc,r C'onzrcss to uttcmpt to 
achiev.._. cqn'lbty. Th•:! rnC'~llL"i 
cho~en to cnrJ was rcc~sonable 
in !'pite of the uncqu;;o.l trr>dtn:cnt of 
single pcople si:1ce lh£'re were 110 ,-iabJC' 
a1'~,-:rn::tti\·e meth0ds n'::.l:~ilOle- to Con· 
gr~s::l to lc·J\'c nlt t:-<~X:J:l\'E'l.s r-qu3l. In-
equality rer.13iTIL'd if the income-<plittLYJ~ 
device ,,·ere t>Xlcndrri to n!l L'lr:lvidu,:.l 
return;.; of Lroth manied ::md .c:ing.c pcr-
svns, sL ... ce then mc.rned m com· 
munity st::~1c>s lndi·:ic!u::tl 
returns :-till be lv·t_ t·~r the~ ..... per-
son."! m·~rri•2d or s;ng-le OLlts:ch: of com-
munity property stat~.-.;; nor \':ould P(llJ:d-
ity be achi~_·vcd if the: income-::p~tttin:::; 
deYicc ·were extenci~~n unl~· to .'olf!g-lo per-
sons .::md m:1..rric~l p~._--.r:--.ons filLTig- joint 
returns, brcc1U:Se the:r o .;:;i-:1;b person 
\V01__l]d l):}\' rl ffil_~ ]' }O'.'"tC'l :~:· '-,_:;.!"'!. +::_~ 
t.:Jx po..Cl by a m<:"i!TiEd f•0!"'S:')I' ',\·ho tiled a 
sep:n<1te n·t11!"11. Furthcrm:;rt"~ :1 sin;le 
per.:::on would abo p.L_\' a t:lx lo\\·er th:m 
tJ1e eflcctin' hx on the :-::une -:J1Nme of a 
martit'U v:'r5'0TI \\'hO~·? SI•OUE"e :J.bO h3d 
significant inC'n:nt:> (both of whose in-
comes were incl,Hied on a j0int return). 
}..fore importantly·, howe\·er, Conc::--rc::.s 
was \\ithin the bounds of its constitu-
tional role since it is concei\'ablc Con-
gress belicYed tr.at rr.arried persons 
generally have ~re:1ter .fi..."'13nci:J.l burdens 
than single pcr:::ons. 6 The recognition of 
such greater bunL'ns is certainly con-
sorn..nt with taxation b1sod o~ :.he ~1bility 
to puy, which 11cts lon~ been an rm~;ort2.11t 
ohjPcti\"C:' of tlw i'1cc•me Llx scheme. The 
degrc>f' of H'N1;~rution ;:::-i\'Pn b~· CDn~Tt'SS 
to U1c proOkrn of ~r(\lter tin.111cial bur-
dens on thr pa! t of the m:nTic>ci ta."'{-
paycrs (see fpotnntc 1, v:as also 
with1n the d1:--rr·~t~on ol smce 
it dov-; not app, 1r ;t~'bltraty or unrc::t:on-
of 
r; fb1d. Ed 2:17. 
e It 1l<'C'll nnt 
CJhle. 'F~urthennore, U:e face akt t~c 
incomc-<plittin~ device g-ra.."'l.ts the 
greJ.t(c:-t amount of tax J'eduction to th'l:::;.e 
incomes simply reflects the 
r<.'tte ~tructurc Gf th2 Internal 
Code. This factor i:a no Wl-y 
n':'~·<Jtc·s tlw idea Uwt the provi3ion v:as 
un 2.cknov:lcdgmerit of the: pTeatcr fin~ 
anci~ll burdens of marri.::d pe-r::::otls since 
in an~· gl\"En incon:e catez-or:-· the rnar~ 
ried pcr."on filing jomtly will pay le5s 
LLX tj8Jl a single person ha\·ins Lhe s3.me 
mc:omc.' 
Petitioner's faith in Hoeper v. TJ.x 
Com~l~i:o-Jirm, 2S1 U.S. 206 [10 AFI'R 
.J.;:",S] (1931 I, a:1d sim1lar ~aS~3 i3 mis-
placed. In Hn<.?p<:r the Ccurt ·w:1s dealing 
w.th a \Yi.::;con3in income tax statute 
v:h;ch adcl•"d a wif8's earnings to her 
hus"t>~ill(..l'.'.> t<~xable income. The Court 
,,t _t[_,-_:.J <J..t pa;;e 217, "It can hcrdly be 
c.:lJiJ;;ed that a mere di£ference in social 
nlatior~ so J.lters the t..a:{able status of 
on2 receh"in~ incom0 JS to justify a 
rL.'Ierent m~a'3ure for the tax." The dis-
tindicm i:Y!l\\·ecn Hoeper rL'l.\1 the pre-
sent c:tse JS that in EO<'!•e:- the state 
\\':1s atle1•1ptmg to t"'X tn th~ husband 
e~ rmng:? \\ hkh were not hi.-:, v:hc~eas in 
this u.se Congress is applying a dii-
fcrcnt rctte of tax to earnin~s conceded 
t0 be petii.ioner's It i;:> fnll.v v"ithin U;e 
·10wcr of Con;rcs.s t.1 ena..t pl'OVI~ioPs 
,'-J.i c; .. r;_; 01" Tt1<:U.t.i.)J;.:; t!l· clitLL f.1l LiJ.Z 
-::-aJuatf'd rate:s. subject tJ t11e restric-
tion c;:;cussed above; th:J.t is. if the 
cf>~.1_!1'?e in the 1aie structUl·e 1s not equ .. '1.l 
:15 bct·•:ecn cl:ls.ses cf taxpayers, there 
must be> a rational Oasis for the distinc-
tion. In this case the geogr8phic equa~ 
liz.o.!:ion of taxpayers as bch\·et:n com-
mlmitv and non-community states and 
the r~co.s'11ition of tJ1e greater financial 
burdens or' married persons provide such 
rettional basis. 
Derision win be entered for the re~ 
spon..dent. 
l[ft 38.51] 58 TC No. 57. ALFONSO 
DIAZ and ~BRIA de ,JESt:S IH.tl, 
Docket No. 71-!-71. 6-29-72. O;·inion by 
T.\.XciENWALD, J. Year 19GG. Decision 
:!:'or T.:t.-....::payer. 
L'-"CO:'tn:: - To whom taxable -
umowlts received by othPrs-\vhethf'lr in· 
come to Utxpayer. Taxpayer's inG-ome 
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8 0, 7 4 6 U.S. Tax e,, .· s 
Thc<-.c princijJltc. <~J'J•h· \\itlr trttLtl f 'ICL' 
here \\here \\C :lfc nr•l C•lnffl•r~!('d '.\ttlr ;ul\' 
cnnt~ntiun tlut :-.,Lcnr \\ ,l.., •lt'lllt'd t1ti<' T·H•t· 
C":' in th~ cnfnrCt'!llCllt ]ll(•("(r·lrrrr; 1•r tJ .. ·n 
Juc, F1: rl1 \lll\'rl• L 
mcnl claims nn a \.:1,;..., 
hcfC!rC the ]J~S Ltttcr prroccdOJrl' 11.rvl•t 
l1avc rcprt''-(1t\rd ;.J.l k.t-.1 :ut { IT()r\ In (trnrr,h 
nOil-incrinnrn',olf\ info: nut inn tn thr ll\ S ;<t,•l 
have permitter} -the cc•urt In nrk 01\ '-! 
(]UC'-lionc. chimed tn l•c ttH-rrnrrrut. ''' i~:rt 
S<·cnr ~irnply rcfu<:c<\ nn Frith \n11 ndrnrnt 
ground-; I·J 5ulnnit to nrry tn!crr(').::;dr(\n 
.C.rnCr' c;,,,-rtr jo;; thu, k<rr('r\ hy ,.,., ·urlr,·rrln 
fr0m l;'t;,ITII.! ,1l.!',lin till' i-...:.uc ot \' hr_·t!,vr lw 
~ropcrh· in~·nh:cr\ hie. pri\ iin.'(' ;>L::<.ill"l q lf-
i;,cr:r,ti;,:,•_;~,:1, \\(' ;·"·c·i n(Jt en:: · ~· 
the mnih his cbi1u tktt cniorccm('nt c•f 
\l1 \]\'-, 'll1llllloJll'o '••d;.) 
\ JTII 'l-ill\1 II\ ' 
\::11 ::--•c••' •i·•l \,,,• r, 
\\\ Tl'•\\' ti .d t),, II' \\, lll'.l• \ '.\•11 
\)],· ,,.,,,\,] l•> '-llj·;• •rl \ 111' ,',l·lc•,\; 11·, 
f.ll·ill...: ,,f .._,,1llt'J,1id• !\~-., r• t til r• 
;:l'ol\1 L' tn l I':Jlj•\\ \\11 lJ til, d1 trlt I l'•llft', 
Fo·lnu:·.ry ](), ]'172 c:1 11,rt• tlltlll •·f•~tr 
II• 1 [ i c 'l ( •f ( l •ll ~ ',1\ll,\ C. 
tli:d c.rr\, r he i,J("co\ tiH· .. c. (): ..._,. ;·L 
];1 \,,,.! 1: \•·\ 
[,J\o·l, \1: 
tl-, 1>1 ,1, r F(l\lf 111••11\\1.;, ! ,\t'f, \".! t To t1.o 
l<•11TI lll[lrl.'l\ 1)·, '-I·Co>:Jo\ \ IIIL'\i\ 'i,·-
ill 1\ I I·C>J>t' tl.:tt .....:_,., l•f ]Ill \') \ 'I> 
;'I •! I]( ~c, l I r, It 1-; c' ,, 11 ~· · ni ,\ 1 -• I i1 ,. 
r.- !~ ;- hrdr\•11" 1·"'1 111 ',·1. 
. \1 ~\I I: l'' I ,II\' l is :1.111 fli I, .• t 
[~ 9343] Vivien Kellems, Arpcllant v. Commissioner of Internal Rcver.ue, Apj1dlec. 
1}. S. Court of .\~·pcab, 2nd C1rcuit, Docket :\o i:!.-?1:!.2, -+,.-1 1 /J 
[CoJeScc.J] 
Tax rates: Unmarried individlvds: Di~crep-,ncic-s: COil">tittHicn:.li:y.-0>-rrcp.lncy 1n 
~..he ta:-: r·•tcs hct_,,;een unmJrrierl ux;nycrs zmU rnc~rnl·J t:...xpJyC:r'> fihn~: JOint retu:-n~ ~'' 
CC·L.., ,:.ltlOIL,3_1 I_,ack reicrence: n ·Wl.15. 
1t(o' \)1\Jl~l\ ]',],1~ \' .. ,~\ ir::'••ll, l'J (' :,,:· :--.lti•!H 
< 1 111\f•l• >11, \ ...... i -!:111t .\ tl<ll 11t \ t ;cn··:-.tl. \} 1 L:r.:!1 ,, . t k~. l.t, 
't-:J:l•~nlol jt\ 11:c, \\':~ l1111"t'lll.· iJ C. ~~~~.3n, 1\•r .q•;·viln: 
Bt:f.),·~ L \Ur\1.\':'-<, /\':\rHK--.(J:-; ,tl'\1 0\Kl", (lf\'iill \Ji•lc:<" 
PrR (L'IU\:-.1 ']he lj( i .... at-llrtlll,j ~~_'-__! L-.,\C c f);':;lJ). -~1/) r _!,\ \{r(", (]11 l·:-
01\ the h:~.::i:; of thl t~r;1 rt'..., n]•tllt',n l 'I~ l . : l oi [ \! '' ~ \ t ,\; ·~ < ( • l \ '< 
below. \\'e find .1!t•nl.: Cr·Jnn!:\,q,.n,·r 
[n 9344] United States of America, Pl.tintitT v. Joc;cph B~ttt.~~,lia, ct ;:tl. DdenJ,tt:.ts. 
V. S. District Court, ~-o. Dt-.t. J 11, E<1:>t l )], .. ~o /t) C.!. o,.:;, 7, \\; ;-_,_ 
[Code Sec. 0013] 
Jo!!lt returns: LiJbility fc:- t:::\):: 
judgment. based on the innocent wtfe 
to the filing of jomt returns. W.J:. 
4 On thts 1ssue \\l' ~~.-. 0111 , ,,'It, ,f. 
lncnmin.lllnn 1n ll~.S c:• 11 .n·., •'•·n ;·r ,,-
ing<: h.n(' dlft•·r. ·:t i 
('fit ('OUL\S [ I' 111 •/ ~'-,'q/, ' 1 ,,j' 1 • i' 
\C'}-2 t~Tr <1:·• I' ~·,t \-..;-, >-..J..: 1:•t11 
(',r 10:/ll. \\ 1\h t!J!i,/ :)•,rlr ~ 1 1\'1 ,f, .v 'i 1' 
Supp 11:.."1 ll.ll (!1 P. 1 1 '1.'" ;,1~·• I, .. ,,, 
i)talr~ r. llntrh 17:)..1 1 -r _ V 
~. J) /\}·-fH_ '2d r '7.:.-jl_:l I!) (' l-11 
47~'-16 JUI•I' ;>:>-· l~!'j.:_J ,l,,f :-,ru.',·, I 
('7J.-l l"!l ' - l' , ,\ ], I~• 
C'11', ~-o \'-; r ,,,,,.I ,' '•r'• • 
}{o,-dcl l' S 1 • J"-;-'1• r.·:, d .,., lt• 
did not nd•• 1.1 p'rn I h, ,. 
T,J,<:f' '•n lhh ~t]·l•l·,tl Til• T•' I}, .. '-. •I r• 
hf'ld that 1\ho're a do·f,·ntl!l:\ (JJ(j 1, t !''" 
~ 9343 
rc•--;tltt ~-·ncnt tn(t(!(nt 
The CO'J.rt. -::.u'-t._illllf.t_: u~e C .. ••l1!TI< ... ::-,:(_;:1Cr'~ 
,. '"'I .r k < ',: \. • 
<loll, r .. <l t•r" 
1 ••t~1' 1 •I •I 
1111' 'k •I I . ~ I • 1·1 
I'' 
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